000			01407nam a2200229 4500
005			20251224125442.0
008			251224b |||||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
020			_a9780262545716
037			_cTextual
040			_aRTL _cRTL
084			_aXogy, Q0 _qRTL
100			_aBalinski, Michel _9859386
245			_aMajority judgment: Measuring, ranking, and electing
260			_aLondon _bThe MIT Press _c2010
300			_axv, 414 p. _bIncludes bibliographical reference and index
520			_aIn Majority Judgment, Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki argue that the traditional theory of social choice offers no acceptable solution to the problems of how to elect, to judge, or to rank. They find that the traditional model—transforming the "preference lists" of individuals into a "preference list" of society—is fundamentally flawed in both theory and practice. Balinski and Laraki propose a more realistic model. It leads to an entirely new theory and method—majority judgment—proven superior to all known methods. It is at once meaningful, resists strategic manipulation, elicits honesty, and is not subject to the classical paradoxes encountered in practice, notably Condorcet's and Arrow's.
650			_aSocial choice _9859387
650			_aVoting _9859388
650			_aRanking and selection (Statistics) _9859389
700			_aLaraki, Rida _eCo-author _9859390
942			_2CC _n0 _cTEXL
999			_c1466528 _d1466528